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We investigate the characteristics and the default behavior of households who take out complex mortgages.
Unlike traditional fixed rate or adjustable rate mortgages, complex mortgages are not fully amortizing
and enable households to postpone loan repayment. We find that complex mortgages are used by sophisticated
households with high income levels and prime credit scores, in contrast to the low income population
targeted by subprime mortgages. Complex mortgage borrowers have significantly higher delinquency
rates than traditional  mortgage borrowers even after controlling for leverage, payment resets, and
other household and loan characteristics. The difference in the delinquency rates between complex
and traditional borrowers increases with  measures of financial sophistication and leverage, suggesting
that complex borrowers are more strategic in their default decisions than traditional borrowers.
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Over the last decade, the residential mortgage market has experienced a signiﬁcant increase in
product complexity, followed by a rapid reversion back to simpler products. The newly popular
set of products featured zero or negative amortization, short interest rate reset periods, and low
introductory teaser interest rates. We term these “complex mortgages” (CM). Figure 1 shows
the proportion of ﬁxed rate (FRM), adjustable rate (ARM), and complex mortgage products
originated between 1995 and 2009, as reported by LPS Applied Analytics (our primary data
source described in detail below). The share of complex mortgages in the U.S. remained below
2% until the second half of 2003 before jumping to about 30% of mortgage originations just
two years later.
While some have conjectured the link between complex mortgages and the recent crisis1,
there has been relatively little academic work on the innovations in mortgage contract design.
Instead, academic research has focused on the role of securitization and the expansion of
credit to subprime borrowers (Mian and Suﬁ (2009), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010),
and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2010b)). We ﬁll this gap by studying the characteristics of
individual households that obtain complex mortgages and their subsequent default behavior.
The deﬁning feature of complex mortgages is the deferral of principal repayment. Complex
mortgages are characterized by low payments during the ﬁrst few years of the contract and
a signiﬁcant increase in payments after mortgage resets, which typically occur after three to
ten years. There are several potential hypotheses behind the appeal of complex mortgage
products. On the one hand, complex mortgages could be predatory products that are pushed
by ﬁnancial institutions to take advantage of naive households who do not fully understand the
contract terms. The low initial payments might obfuscate the long-term borrowing costs for
1For example, in his speech at the 2010 American Economic Association Meetings in Atlanta, Ben Bernanke
conjectures that “The availability of these alternative mortgage products proved to be quite important and, as
many have recognized, is likely a key explanation of the housing bubble.” The full text of the speech can be
obtained at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.pdf.
1naive households (Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Carlin (2009), and Carlin and Manso (2010)).
Mortgage lenders might have an incentive to introduce complex products to shroud the total
costs of borrowing via intricate reset schedules, prepayment penalties, and short-lived teaser
interest rates. Lenders might be particularly eager to oﬀer these products if they are conﬁdent
in their ability to securitize them. In this case, we should observe that complex mortgages
are taken out primarily by unsophisticated households that do not understand the speciﬁc
features of their contracts.2
On the other hand, complex mortgages might be taken out by sophisticated borrowers.
The low initial payments of complex mortgages can relax household liquidity and borrowing
constraints and enable households to take larger exposures in housing assets. These products
can be beneﬁcial if households expect their income levels or housing prices to increase over time
(Cocco (2010), Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2010), and Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010)) or if
households want to reduce their tax burdens due to the deductibility of mortgage interest from
taxable income (Amromin, Huang, and Sialm (2007)). Moreover, complex mortgages might
be preferred by households that are less averse to defaulting in case of unfavorable income and
house price shocks. These households might be more risk seeking or less inﬂuenced by ethical
norms to pay back their debt (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009)). By minimizing the initial
mortgage payments and keeping a high mortgage balance, these households maximize the value
of the default option. The incentive to exercise this option should be stronger for non-recourse
loans, where lenders do not have access to the non-collateralized household assets in case of
delinquency. In this case, complex mortgages should be a hallmark of sophisticated borrowers
who are aware of the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts (e.g., relaxing liquidity constraints) and
the costs (e.g., increasing default risk) of these products.
To study the mortgage choices of households and their default experiences, we make ex-
2This characterization of complex mortgages also corresponds to the portrayal of complex mortgages in
the media. See, for example, the New York Times article, How Countrywide Covered the Cracks,b yG r e t c h e n
Morgenson, October 16, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/business/17trial.html.
2tensive use of data provided by LPS Analytics. The database, described in detail in Section 2,
contains loan level information for a large sample of mortgages in the United States. Of par-
ticular relevance for our analysis is the ability to identify precise contract terms at the time
of loan origination and realized payment behavior over the lifetime of the loan.
We ﬁrst investigate the characteristics of households that take out complex mortgages.
Using the LPS Analytics data, we ﬁnd that such mortgages are used by relatively sophisti-
cated households with high income levels and prime credit scores. Therefore, this group of
borrowers is distinct from the subprime borrowers that have received much attention in recent
studies. We also ﬁnd that geographic areas with higher past house price appreciation, with
higher population growth, and with a higher proportion of young households have a greater
proportion of complex mortgages, suggesting that the expectation of continued house price ap-
preciation and income growth is a likely driving force behind the popularity of CM contracts.
Complex loans are also more prevalent in non-recourse states, where non-collateralized assets
of the households are protected. These results indicate that complex loans are originated
to relatively sophisticated households that are less likely to be fooled by predatory lending
practices.
We next study the default behavior of CM borrowers. We posit that complex mortgages
might have diﬀerent delinquency rates because of diﬀerences in their contractual design or
because of inherent diﬀerences in default propensities of households that self select into such
contracts. The contractual design of complex mortgages can change the delinquency rate for
two reasons. First, CM payments can change signiﬁcantly over time, as low initial payments
on back-loaded contracts rise after amortization resets. Thus, defaults on complex mortgages
might initially be lower than defaults on fully-amortizing contracts, but increase following re-
sets. Households who are already stretching to meet the initial payments might have diﬃculty
meeting the additional monthly payments, especially if they experience unfavorable income or
expenditure shocks. This type of default is termed a “cash ﬂow default.” Second, the lack of
3amortization inevitably leads to higher loan-to-value ratios for any given path of house prices.
Rational households might optimally choose to default on their mortgages when the current
value of the house is lower than the remaining loan balance even if they have suﬃcient income
to cover the payments. This type of default is termed a “strategic default.” Therefore, the
back loaded feature of complex mortgages can aﬀect both cash ﬂow and strategic defaults. Fi-
nally, complex mortgages might also attract a diﬀerent borrower clientele, as described above.
This clientele, characterized by greater sophistication and willingness to exercise their default
option, might generate higher delinquency rates, holding loan and borrower characteristics
ﬁxed.
We ﬁnd that complex mortgages indeed have signiﬁcantly higher unconditional delinquency
rates than both FRM and ARM contracts after the ﬁrst 18 months since mortgage origina-
tion. Households that self select into complex mortgages appear to be diﬀerent from other
households. Even after controlling for leverage, payment resets, and other household and loan
characteristics, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly higher default rates among CM borrowers. The diﬀerence
in the delinquency rates between complex and traditional borrowers increases both with mea-
sures of ﬁnancial sophistication (like income or credit scores) and measures of strategic default
(like the LTV ratio). Moreover, complex borrowers exhibit a smaller increase in the probabil-
ity of declaring bankruptcy after defaulting on their mortgages than traditional borrowers. To
the extent that declaring personal bankruptcy is an indication of ﬁnancial constraints, com-
plex mortgage borrowers who become delinquent on their mortgages tend to be less distressed
than other types of borrowers. In summary, our ﬁndings suggest that complex mortgages are
a signiﬁcant driving force behind the mounting defaults during the recent crisis. Moreover,
the defaults are driven not only by the backloaded feature of complex mortgage payments
but also by the characteristics of complex borrowers who are more strategic in their default
decisions than other types of mortgage borrowers.
While the extension of credit to subprime borrowers and mortgage securitization have
4received much attention following the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009, the choice and impact of
mortgage complexity remains largely unexplored. Mian and Suﬁ (2009) show that the sharp
increase in mortgage defaults in 2007 is signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed in geographic areas with a high
density of subprime loans that experienced an unprecedented growth in mortgage credit prior
to 2007. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) focus on the role of mortgage securitization
process, ﬁnding that it lowered the screening incentives of loan originators for their subprime
borrowers. Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2010b) study the relation between mortgage securiti-
zation and loan performance and ﬁnd that lenders apply lower screening eﬀorts on loans that
have higher ex ante probabilities of being securitized.3 Our paper contributes to this literature
by suggesting an additional and important channel linking mortgage market innovations to
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009.
A few recent papers have investigated the role of non-traditional mortgage contracts in the
recent crisis. Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) study optimal mortgage design in an environment
with risky privately observable income and costly foreclosure and show that the features of the
optimal mortgage contract are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage contract.
Corbae and Quintin (2010) present a model where heterogeneous households select from a set
of mortgage contracts and have a choice of defaulting on their payments. Using their model,
they ﬁnd that the presence of subprime mortgages with low down payments substantially
ampliﬁes foreclosure rates in the presence of a large exogenous shock to house prices. In a
contemporaneous paper, Barlevy and Fisher (2010) describe a rational expectations model in
which both speculators and their lenders use interest-only mortgages when there is a bubble
3Additional papers on securitization and the expansion of credit to subprime borrowers include Adelino,
Gerardi, and Willen (2009), Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz (2009), Deng and Quigley (2009), Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig (2009), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009), Agarwal, Ambrose,
Chomsisengphet, and Sanders (2010), Bajari, Chu, and Park (2010), Barlevy and Fisher (2010), Berndt,
Holliﬁeld, and Sandas (2010), Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2010), Corbae and Quintin (2010), Gabriel
and Rosenthal (2010), Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2010), Glaeser, Gottleb, and Gyourko (2010), Goetzmann,
Peng, and Yen (2010), Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2010a), Li, White, and Zhu (2010), Melzer (2010), Piskorski,
Seru, and Vig (2010), Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010), Woodward and Hall (2010), An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011),
Demyanyk and Hemert (2011), and Purnanandam (2011).
5in house prices. They provide evidence that interest only mortgages were used extensively in
cities where inelastic housing supply enables pronounced boom-bust cycles. Our paper studies
empirically the characteristics and the default experiences of borrowers of complex loans.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources
and reports summary statistics. In Section 3 we study the mortgage choice of households and
describe the main features of mortgage contracts. In Section 4 we study the delinquency of
diﬀerent contract types. Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
This section describes in detail the data sources and diﬀerences of the main mortgage contracts
oﬀered in the United States over the last decade.
2.1 Data
Our study relies on several complementary data sources that cover various aspects of the hous-
ing market during the period between 2003 and 2009. In particular, the micro level analysis
of mortgage contract choice and performance relies heavily on the proprietary mortgage-level
database oﬀered by Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied Analytics (formerly known as
McDash Analytics). LPS collects data from some of the nation’s largest mortgage servicers
that report contract and borrower details at the time of loan origination, as well as monthly
information on mortgage performance. The LPS data coverage has grown steadily over time,
with 9 out of 10 largest servicers reporting to the database by 2003. Our database covers
about 10 million mortgages with a total loan value of more than $2 trillion originated between
2003 and 2007. We track the performance of all loans till the end of 2009.
For the purposes of our study, the availability of granular information on mortgage contract
terms is of particular importance. For each of the loans, LPS provides information on the loan
interest rate, the amortization schedule, and the securitization status. For adjustable rate
6mortgages (ARMs), we know the rate at origination, the frequency of resets, the reference
rate, and the associated contractual spread. For loans that do not amortize steadily over
their term, we know the horizon of the interest-only period, whether negative amortization
is allowed and if so, to what extent and over what period of time. This information allows
us to precisely categorize loan contracts. The LPS data also contains key information on
borrower and property characteristics at the time of origination. These include the appraised
property value, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), property type (single family or condominium),
whether the property was to be occupied by the borrower, and the borrower’s creditworthiness
as measured by their FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) credit score.4
An important feature of the LPS database is that unlike some other data sources, it is not
limited to a particular subset of the loan universe. The LPS data cover prime, subprime, and
Alt-A loans,5 and include loans that are privately securitized, those that are sold to Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), and loans that are held on banks’ balance sheets. Even
though the coverage allows for a broad set of mortgage contracts, the data set is somewhat
skewed in favor of securitized loans that are more likely to be serviced by large corporations re-
porting to LPS. Still, the large overall size of the dataset ensures that we have ample coverage
of all contract types.
We complement borrower information in LPS with household income data collected under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Doing so allows us to compute some of the key
measures of loan aﬀordability, such as the ratio of house value to income (VTI). We further
augment the loan-level data with information on trends in local home prices. Quarterly data
4As Bajari, Chu, and Park (2010) emphasize, an important feature of the FICO score is that it measures
a borrower’s creditworthiness prior to taking out the mortgage. FICO scores range between 300 and 850
Typically, a FICO score above 800 is considered very good, while a score below 620 is considered subprime.
As reported on the Fair Isaac Corporation website (www.myﬁco.com), borrowers with FICO scores above 760
are able to take out 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgages at interest rates that are 160 basis points lower, on average,
than those available for borrowers with scores in the 620-639 range.
5Alt-A loans are a middle category of loans, more risky than prime and less risky than subprime. They
are generally made to borrowers with good credit scores, but the loans have characteristics that make them
ineligible to be sold to the GSEs-for example, limited documentation of the income or assets of the borrower
or higher loan-to-value ratios than those speciﬁed by GSE limits.
7on home prices is available by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA)-an independent federal agency that is the successor to the Oﬃce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and other government entities.6 We use the
all-transactions FHFA House Price Index (HPI) that is based on repeat sales and reﬁnancing
information. We use the index to construct borrower-speciﬁc variables on cumulative growth
in local house prices. At the more aggregate level, we utilize zip code level information from
the 2000 U.S. Census to control for broad demographic characteristics, such as education
levels and age distributions. We also make use of the annual per capita income level and
unemployment rate data at the MSA level from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
To determine whether lender recourse has an impact on mortgage choices and mortgage
defaults we follow Ghent and Kudlyak (2010) and classify U.S. states into recourse and non-
recourse categories. Whereas lender claims in non-recourse states are limited to the value of
the collateral securing the loan, lenders in recourse states may be able to collect on debt not
covered by the proceedings from a foreclosure sale by obtaining a deﬁciency judgment.7
The summary statistics on these variables are presented in Table 1 and we will discuss
diﬀerences in these variables across mortgage types in more detail in Section 2.3. All of the
variables discussed above are described in Table 12.
6As part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), the Federal Housing Finance
Regulatory Reform Act of 2008 established a single regulator, the FHFA, for GSEs involved in the home
mortgage market, namely, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks. The FHFA
was formed by a merger of the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB), and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s government-sponsored
enterprise mission team (see www.fhfa.gov for additional details).
7Ghent and Kudlyak (2010) classify the following states as non-recourse: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. There is some ambiguity
with respect to the recourse status of California loans. Reﬁnance loans in California are subject to recourse
only if the lender chooses to pursue judicial foreclosure. Although we observe whether a loan is used for
new purchase or reﬁnancing, we cannot assess the credibility of the threat of lender recourse through judicial
foreclosure. In this paper, only new purchase loans in California are deﬁned as non-recourse. The results are
robust to categorizing all California loans as non-recourse.
82.2 Mortgage Contract Design
The menu of household mortgage choices was dominated for decades by fully-amortizing long-
term ﬁxed rate mortgages (FRM) and, to a lesser extent, by adjustable rate mortgages (ARM)
that locked in the initial interest rate for the ﬁrst years of the contract. From the vantage
point of the borrower, FRM contracts preserve contract terms established at origination for
the lifetime of the loan. For practical purposes, the same can be said of ARM contracts
with a relatively long ﬁxed rate period, given the average borrower tenure at a particular
house of about seven years. Knowing the monthly servicing costs and amortization schedules
simpliﬁes the household budgeting problem. Over the last decade, complex mortgages (CM)
that allow for the deferral of principal repayment have become increasingly popular. They
typically feature zero or negative amortization, short interest rate reset periods, and very low
introductory teaser interest rates. The vast majority of CM also exhibit adjustable interest
rates.
In this section we illustrate the diﬀerent payment patterns of some popular U.S. mortgage
contracts. We classify all mortgage products into three groups: (1) Fixed Rate Mortgages
(FRM); (2) Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM); and (3) Complex Mortgages (CM).
Fixed rate mortgages are level-payment fully-amortizing loans with maturities between
15 and 30 years. For example, a 30-year $500,000 ﬁxed rate mortgage with a 5% interest
rate requires equal monthly payments of $2,684 for 360 months, at which point it is paid
oﬀ completely. Borrowers generally have the option to prepay the mortgage if they sell the
property or if they reﬁnance their loan due to a decrease in mortgage interest rates.
Adjustable rate mortgages are fully-amortizing loans where the interest rate changes after
an initial period according to a preselected interest rate index. These mortgages exhibit
caps and ﬂoors that prevent interest rates from changing too much over the lifetime of the
loan. ARM interest rates are generally lower than those on FRMs due to the increasing
9term structure of interest rates and the availability of the prepayment option in FRMs.8
For example, a 30-year 5/1 ARM for $500,000 with a 4.5% initial interest rate has initial
mortgage payments of $2,533 per month for the ﬁrst 60 months. Subsequently, the payments
can increase or decrease depending on the level of interest rates. If the interest rate rises to
7%, the monthly payment in the sixth year increases to $3,221.9
Complex mortgages include a variety of back-loaded mortgage contracts. Most complex
mortgages feature adjustable interest rates and exhibit time-varying amortization schedules.
The most popular contract is an Interest Only (IO) mortgage that only requires borrowers
to pay the mortgage interest over an initial time period lasting typically between ﬁve and
ten years. Subsequently, the mortgage becomes a fully-amortizing loan. For example, a 5-
year IO adjustable rate loan with a 30-year maturity, a $500,000 initial balance, and a 4.5%
initial interest rate has initial mortgage payments of $1,875 per month for the ﬁrst 60 months.
Subsequently, the payments reset according to the future interest rates. If the interest rate
increases to 7%, then the monthly payment in the sixth year will almost double to $3,534, as
the loan also begins to amortize. Even if interest rates remain at 4.5%, the mortgage payment
will increase to $2,779 per month at the end of the initial interest-only period. The payments
increase even more for mortgages with longer interest-only periods.
The other popular type of a complex mortgage is a Negative Amortization Mortgage
(NEGAM), also known as an Option ARM. These mortgages give borrowers the option to
initially pay even less than the interest due. The diﬀerence between the interest due and the
actual mortgage payment is added to the loan balance. These mortgages carry the risk of larger
increases in mortgage payments, when the mortgage is recast to become a fully amortizing
8Fixed rate mortgages can be reﬁnanced when interest rates decrease, which is a very valuable option that
is priced in the initial interest rate. There are numerous papers on prepayments. See for example, Dunn
and McConnell (1981), Schwartz and Torous (1989), Stanton (1995), Dunn and Spatt (1999), Deng, Quigley,
and Gabriel (2000), Longstaﬀ (2005), Campbell (2006), Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007), and
Schwartz (2007).
9Several papers study the tradeoﬀ between FRMs and ARMs (e.g., Campbell and Cocco (2003), Vickery
(2007), and Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009)).
10loan after 5-10 years or when the loan balance exceeds the initial balance at origination by
more than a certain amount (typically 10-25%). An additional common feature of NEGAM
is a low teaser interest rate of between 1-2% during the ﬁrst 1-12 months. The minimum
payment on a NEGAM contract is often set at the level suﬃcient to cover teaser interest rate
charges, and is raised by up to 7.5% on each anniversary of the loan.10
2.3 Summary Statistics by Mortgage Type
Table 2 reports statistics for our broad mortgage categories – fully-amortizing ﬁxed rate, fully-
amortizing adjustable rate, and complex mortgage types. Complex mortgages are further
separated into interest only and negative amortization loans. Our data contain in excess of 10
million loan contracts originated between 2003 and 2007. In our sample, 70% of mortgages are
ﬁxed rate mortgages, 13% are adjustable rate mortgages, and the remaining 17% are complex
mortgages.
Complex mortgages, on average, are associated with higher loan amounts relative to the
traditional ARM and FRM mortgages, and are used to ﬁnance more expensive houses. For
example, the average home value for complex loans is $471,754, whereas the average home
values for FRMs and ARMs are $264,189 and $307,238, respectively.
Counter to some of the commonly made assertions about complex mortgages, complex
mortgages are extended to borrowers with high income levels and prime credit scores. In-
deed, households that take out complex mortgages report signiﬁcantly higher annual incomes
($133,581) than households borrowing through ﬁxed rate ($87,835) or adjustable rates mort-
gages ($99,816). This diﬀerence persists even when the sample is restricted to loans underwrit-
10There are several possible reasons why complex mortgages became more popular in the early 2000s. First,
borrowers and lenders might have increased their real estate appreciation expectations during the period of
the housing price bubble. Second, the low interest rate environment of the early 2000s appears to improve the
attractiveness of low amortization instruments for borrowers. For example, the monthly mortgage payment
on a 30-year FRM with an initial balance of $500,000 is $2,108 using a 3% interest rate. The initial payment
on a corresponding IO mortgage is 40.7% lower ($1,250 vs. $2,108). On the other hand, the initial mortgage
payment is only 9.1% lower for an IO mortgage compared to a FRM ($3,333 vs. $3,669) at an 8% interest
rate.
11ten on the basis of fully documented income. Panel A of Figure 2 summarizes the cumulative
distribution function of income levels of FRM, ARM, and CM borrowers. The income dis-
tribution for CM borrowers lies well to the right of the distribution of borrowers using fully
amortizing ARM and FRM contracts. We also ﬁnd that CM borrowers have credit scores
that are better than ARM borrowers and similar to those of FRM borrowers. Whereas 24%
of ARM borrowers have FICO credit scores below 620, the same can be said of only 10%
of FRM and only 6% of CM borrowers. Panel B of Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of
FICO scores for diﬀerent mortgage contracts. These results emphasize that the clientele for
complex mortgages diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that for subprime loans.
Nevertheless, the average ratio of house val u et oi n c o m e( V T I ) — a ni n v e r s em e a s u r eo f
aﬀordability—is considerably higher in complex mortgage contracts, suggesting that CM bor-
rowers are purchasing more expensive houses relative to their income. Panel C of Figure 2
indicates that CM borrowers tend to have substantially higher VTI ratios than both ARM
and FRM borrowers. Median households using FRMs, ARMs, and CMs have value-to-income
ratios of 3.0, 3.1, and 3.8, respectively. Thus, for a given level of income CM borrowers pur-
chase houses valued at about 20% more, likely aided by the lower initial payments on their
mortgage contracts. Yet, higher spending on houses is not reﬂected in the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios, as all mortgage types have similar ﬁrst lien LTV values.11
Several other loan characteristics are diﬀerent for complex mortgages. CM borrowers are
more likely to live in a condominium and are slightly more likely to use the property they
are ﬁnancing for investment purposes. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the frequency of
prepayment penalties across mortgage types. Unlike FRMs, a signiﬁcant fraction of ARMs
and CMs face penalties if the loans are prepaid within the ﬁrst two or three years. Complex
mortgages have a slightly higher share of reﬁnancings compared to new purchases.
11LPS data is collected at the loan and not property level, which limits one’s ability to construct an accurate
estimate of the total debt secured by the house. In particular, we are unable to account for second-lien
mortgages loans (the so-called “piggyback loans”) used to ﬁnance the house.
12Since complex loans are particularly popular for expensive homes, they are also more likely
to exceed the conforming loan limit (i.e. be jumbo loans). Hence, although 79% of FRMs are
securitized by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
amd Ginnie Mae), only 26% of CMs go through the GSEs. Private securitization partially
oﬀsets the lack of GSE involvement in the ARM and CM markets.
Complex mortgage borrowers receive signiﬁcantly lower initial interest rates than FRM or
ARM borrowers. The mean initial interest rate on complex mortgages of 5.04% is signiﬁcantly
lower than the rates on FRMs (6.16%) and ARMs (6.17%). This result is primarily caused
by negative amortization mortgages that charge, on average, an initial teaser interest rate
of only 1.86%. For each ARM and CM loan we impute the rate such borrowers might have
received had they chosen a conventional 30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage instead. We deﬁne such
hypothetical rate as the average interest rate on all 30-year FRMs originated in the same
month, state, with similar loan size, LTV ratio, and FICO score. The hypothetical FRM
interest rate is similar across the various contracts.
Unfortunately, we do not observe the age and the education level of borrowers directly.
However, we can compute the proportion of adults in zip codes between 20 and 40 years and
the proportion of adults with a college education. We ﬁnd that CM borrowers tend to live in
cities with higher education levels.
From a spatial standpoint, complex mortgages are more common in geographic areas that
experienced high house price appreciation. The average 5-year cumulative price appreciation
among complex borrowers amounted to 74%, as compared with 50% among traditional FRM
borrowers. Finally, the population growth rate and the unemployment rate at the time of
origination, which capture macroeconomic conditions at the MSA level, are similar in areas
with diﬀerent mortgage compositions.
Complex mortgages are more likely to be non-recourse, where the lender cannot access as-
sets of the defaulting households beyond the value of the collateral securing the loan. Whereas
13only 16% of FRMs are non-recourse, 27% of CMs are non-recourse.
The last two columns of Table 2 break out the key summary characteristics among the
two complex mortgage types. Negative amortization loans, on average, appear to be used to
ﬁnance more expensive homes and are associated with higher loan values. They also display
the highest VTI ratios. As expected, negative amortization loans with their low teaser interest
rates commonly carry prepayment penalties. Finally, IO contracts appear to have been subject
to stricter underwriting criteria. Whereas only 20% of IOs were underwritten on the basis of
less than full documentation, 43% of NEGAM loans were issued in this manner.
2.4 Aﬀordability of Diﬀerent Mortgage Contracts
Complex mortgage products initially have relatively low payments that enable the purchase
of more expensive homes. Figure 3 depicts the ratio of the monthly payments on ARMs and
CMs relative to hypothetical FRM loans of the same amount. The terms of such FRMs are
derived from loans originated in the same month and state for borrowers with similar FICO
scores and loan-to-value ratios. We observe that during the ﬁrst year the majority of ARMs
and CMs have lower payments; for the majority of CMs (52.3%) payments are at least 20%
lower. Panels B and C show that payments remain lower for the vast majority of surviving
CMs even three or ﬁve years after origination. Thus, a relatively small fraction of complex
mortgages have substantial payment resets that could not be managed by reﬁnancing into a
new contract. This indicates that CM borrowers continued to have relatively low payments
throughout the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009.
An alternative way to illustrate the evolution of payments is to compare payments over time
to those realized during the ﬁrst year. Figure 4 shows the majority of CMs do not experience
signiﬁcant jumps in payments during the ﬁrst ﬁve years. In fact, monthly payments rise by
more than 20% only for 11.6% (26.2%) of CM borrowers after three (ﬁve) years.
By virtue of their amortization structure, complex loans largely maintain a high leverage
14ratio over time. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of the remaining mortgage balance one,
three, and ﬁve years after origination relative to the original balance. Even after ﬁve years
(Panel C), less than 20% of surviving complex mortgages paid down more than 5% of their
initial balance, while about 14% increased their balance by 5% or more. This creates a sharp
contrast with FRM and ARM borrowers who gradually pay down their loans. This dynamic
deterioration in relative leverage ratios becomes particularly dramatic in the event of slower
house price appreciation, as experienced during the housing crisis of 2007-2009.12
3M o r t g a g e C h o i c e
In this section, we analyze the characteristics of mortgage borrowers more systematically,
relating to the hypotheses outlined in the Introduction. To recall, complex mortgages may
be: (i) an appealing contract for lenders because they allow to obfuscate terms to naive
households; (ii) an optimal contract for borrowers expecting income growth and house price
appreciation; and (iii) a contract that attracts a self-selected set of borrowers that seek to
make a concentrated bet on housing and that are aware of the value of the default option.
3.1 Multinomial Logit Regressions of Contract Choice
We estimate the likelihood of selection of a particular mortgage contract type (ARM or CM)
relative to a baseline contract, which we take to be an FRM. These relative likelihoods are
estimated as a function of loan- and borrower-level covariates, as well as MSA-level aggregates.








12The higher long-term loan-to-value ratios of complex loans may have contributed to a further deterioration
in housing markets, as suggested by the leverage eﬀect of Stein (1995) and Lamont and Stein (1999). Additional
papers that study the macro-economic aspects of housing prices include Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005),
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007), Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008),
Landvoigt, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2010), Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), and Favilukis, Ludvigson,
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011).
15where Prob(Yi = m)/Prob(Yi = FRM) is the probability of obtaining an ARM or CM relative
to a FRM, X is a vector of mortgage-speciﬁc covariates, FETimeare indicator variables for the
origination quarters, FEState are state indicator variables, and FELender are lender-speciﬁc
indicator variables. To facilitate the interpretation of the economic signiﬁcance of the results,
we standardize the continuous variables by subtracting their mean and dividing by their
standard deviation.
Table 3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients. All regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects and
the standard errors are clustered by MSA. Since some of the MSA level variables are not
available for the full sample, the corresponding speciﬁcations include fewer observations than
the overall sample summarized in Table 2. In addition, for computational reasons we only
include the largest 50 lenders in the speciﬁcation with lender ﬁxed eﬀects.
We ﬁnd little support for the ﬁrst hypothesis that complex mortgages are pushed to naive
households by predatory lenders, in which case we should expect these loans to be concentrated
in low income areas with poorly educated households. Instead, we ﬁnd that households with
higher income levels are signiﬁcantly more likely to obtain a complex mortgage than to take
out a more traditional FRM loan. The estimates imply that a one standard deviation change
in log income raises the ratio between the probabilities of choosing a CM over an FRM contract
almost twofold (e0.64 =1 .90).
While it is possible that the positive association between CM contract choice and income
reﬂects the propensity of CMs to be concentrated in high income MSAs, speciﬁcations that
incorporate MSA-level controls and state ﬁxed eﬀects preserve these relationships. Therefore,
even within individual geographies, complex mortgage choice is favored by the relatively well-
oﬀ. These state ﬁxed eﬀects also control for other unobserved state-speciﬁc diﬀerences in
regulation, topography, and geography.13
13Our main results also remain qualitatively unaﬀected if we include MSA ﬁxed eﬀects instead of the state
ﬁxed eﬀects.
16It is also possible that the contract choices reﬂect the decision of lenders, who determine the
menu of available contract options and possibly also steer the borrowers towards certain items
on the menu. By including lender ﬁxed eﬀects, we control for the fact that some lenders might
oﬀer only speciﬁc mortgage instruments and might target speciﬁc clienteles. The coeﬃcient
on income remains highly statistically signiﬁcant after including lender ﬁxed eﬀects.
Moreover, households with higher FICO scores are substantially more likely to choose a
CM than to choose an ARM, although the results are mixed when we compare the propensity
t oc h o o s eaC Mr e l a t i v et oaF R M . 14 Areas with higher proportions of college graduates and
with higher median incomes are also associated with a higher proportion of CM contracts.
Overall, there is little evidence that a typical complex mortgage is taken out by poor and
naive households that are more prone to predatory lending. These results are consistent with
the survey evidence of Cox, Brounen, and Neuteboom (2011), who ﬁnd that Dutch households
with lower ﬁnancial literary and with higher risk aversion are less likely to select mortgages
with deferred amortization schedules.
We ﬁnd some evidence consistent with the second hypothesis of complex mortgages being
“aﬀordability products” for households that anticipate income or house price growth. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the loan-to-value (LTV) and the value-to-income (VTI) ratios are
signiﬁcantly higher for CM households, suggesting that these households are stretching their
budget to aﬀord more expensive homes.
While we do not observe household expectations for their income and house price growth,
we introduce several proxies for these expectations. Since young households anticipate a
higher growth rate of their labor income than older households, we use the proportion of
adults between 20 and 40 years to proxy for income expectations and ﬁnd that CM contracts
are more popular in areas with a larger portion of younger households. To the extent that
14The coeﬃcient on the FICO score variable is signiﬁcantly positive for CM if we select ARMs as the baseline
group or if we run a simple logit regression.
17households extrapolate past local experiences to build their expectations about future house
price dynamics, we use the prior ﬁve years’ house price appreciation in the MSA to proxy for
the expected future house price growth. Borrowers in geographic areas where appreciation
was substantial might be more willing to accept non-amortizing loans if they expect the
appreciation to continue in the future. In addition, the prior one-year population growth rate
in the MSA captures the migration pressure. Geographic areas with signiﬁcant population
growth might be areas where households expect signiﬁcant house price and income growth.
We ﬁnd that past house price appreciation and the local population growth signiﬁcantly
increase the propensity of obtaining a CM. This evidence suggests that the expectations of
continued house price and income growth are likely a driving force behind the popularity
of complex mortgages. Another piece of evidence consistent with the idea of CM contracts
as aﬀordability product is that they are much more prevalent for mortgages above the GSE
conforming loan limit. Such mortgages cannot be securitized by the GSEs and, consequently,
result in somewhat higher interest rates (the so-called jumbo spread). This increases the
relative appeal of payment-shrinking CM products.
Finally, we also ﬁnd supporting evidence for the third hypothesis that complex mortgages
are selected by a diﬀerent type of households who might be less averse to strategic default.
In particular, we observe that CM borrowers are much more likely to provide incomplete
documentation for their loans. The greater reliance of CM contracts on low-documentation
underwriting is consistent with borrowers’ eﬀort to inﬂate their income to qualify for a higher
loan amount needed for an expensive house. To the extent that these households are willing
to hide or manipulate their income information in the loan application process, it is possible
that they are also less bound by ethical norms to pay back their debt when it is not in their
interest to do so.
In addition, we ﬁnd that CM mortgages are also more likely to be used to ﬁnance condo-
miniums and investment properties. Owners of these properties have potentially lower costs
18of strategically defaulting on their properties. They might therefore have an incentive to pay
down their mortgage balance relatively slowly to increase the option value of strategic default.
Moreover, we also ﬁnd that households in non-recourse states are signiﬁcantly more likely
to obtain a complex mortgage than households in recourse states. This might be caused by
the higher option value of defaulting on non-recourse mortgages, when a delinquent household
can simply walk away without worrying about lenders accessing their other assets.
In summary, we ﬁnd that CM borrowers are well-educated high-income households with
prime credit scores. They are stretching their budget to purchase expensive houses, partly
due to their expectation of higher future income or house price growth. They might also be
more receptive to the idea of strategic default than traditional mortgage borrowers as they
are more likely to provide incomplete documentation, to purchase investment properties, and
to reside in non-recourse states.
3.2 Robustness Tests
Table 4 reports the coeﬃcients of multinomial logit regressions that further diﬀerentiate be-
tween the two main types of complex contracts. The estimates are consistent with the univari-
ate results in Table 2. In particular, we see that NEGAM contracts are used by high-income
borrowers to reﬁnance their high-priced primary residences, often on the basis of only lim-
ited income and asset documentation. It is likely that such reﬁnancings are serial in nature,
which further underscores the fragility of such contracts in environments where the reﬁnancing
markets freeze up.
Our conclusion that borrowers of complex mortgages are relatively ﬁnancially sophisticated
is partially based on the fact that these borrowers report higher income levels. However, the
income levels of low-documentation borrowers are not veriﬁed and might not be reliable.
To investigate whether this biases our results, Table 5 presents the CM coeﬃcients of the
19multinomial logit regressions for the sample of households with full documentation loans.15
Overall, conditioning on full documentation loans has no qualitative eﬀect on our main results.
Table 5 also shows that our results remain materially unaﬀected if we only study purchase
transactions or investment properties. Since our database might undersample portfolio loans,
we also report the results of the 10% of loans that are not securitized. The coeﬃcient on income
increases in this speciﬁcation, whereas the coeﬃcients on the other variables are not aﬀected
much. Finally, we exclude all mortgages originated in the state of California, which accounts
for around 15% of our observations but a greater proportion of the CM loans. Whereas most
coeﬃcients remain stable in this speciﬁcation, the non-recourse mortgage coeﬃcient decreases
somewhat, but remains economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
In unreported robustness tests we run separate multinomial logit models for each year
and document that the determinants of mortgage choice are relatively stable over time. For
example, the income level is positively related to the choice of complex mortgages for each
year in our sample.
4 Mortgage Delinquencies
In this section we study the delinquency outcomes of diﬀerent types of mortgages. A mortgage
is considered delinquent if the borrower is at least 60 days late with the payment.
4.1 Reasons for Mortgage Delinquencies
The existing literature diﬀerentiates between two types of delinquencies: (i) “cash ﬂow de-
faults” that occur because of unfavorable income shocks or changes in required loan payment
and (ii) “strategic defaults” that reﬂect optimal borrower exercise of the default option.
Since the required payment on CM contracts may change due to both interest rate and
15About half of our observations have a missing “Low Documentation” variable. Our base case results in
Table 3 include these households, setting the “Low Documentation” value to zero. Thus, Table 5 includes
only the households for which we know explicitly that they submitted fully documented loan applications.
20amortization schedule resets, they may subject the borrower to greater hazard of cash ﬂow
defaults. On the other hand, the initial low mortgage payments may lessen this hazard during
the early years of the loan. The same can be said of the contracts (e.g., Option ARMs) that
give borrowers the ﬂexibility to adjust their payments as their income ﬂows ﬂuctuate.
The fact that CM borrowers have higher loan-to-value ratios for any given path of house
prices (Figure 5) also makes them more likely to enter the strategic default state, the necessary
condition for which is negative home equity. The higher embedded equity of an ARM or FRM
borrower makes it more likely that they will continue making payments in the case of a house
price shock or sell their home in the case of ﬁnancial diﬃculties, relative to a CM borrower
that is more likely to choose to walk away from their loan.
Finally, as we have shown in the previous section, borrowers that choose CM contacts
might have other unobservable characteristics that make them more prone to default relative to
traditional mortgage holders. For example, these households might be more risk seeking, have
more volatile income streams, or be more ﬁnancially sophisticated and thus more receptive to
the idea of strategic default.
Our empirical strategy will be to control to the greatest extent possible for measures as-
sociated with cash ﬂow shocks and the value of the default option and check whether the
remaining diﬀerences in delinquencies (if any) may be attributed to self-selection of sophisti-
cated households into CM contracts.
4.2 Summary of Mortgage Delinquency
Figure 6 plots the distribution of mortgage delinquencies by contract type during the ﬁrst
ﬁve years after origination. In each month we depict the proportion of remaining mortgages
that become delinquent for the ﬁrst time. We observe that complex mortgages have strictly
higher delinquency rates than ﬁxed rate mortgages at all horizons. Mortgage delinquencies
of complex loans reach peaks of 1.2% of surviving loans 27 and 39 months after origination.
21These peaks occur three months after common reset intervals, since delinquency begins when
a mortgage payment is at least 60 days late. We observe a similar peak for ARMs at the
27-month horizon. The same information cumulated over time is presented in Panel A of
Table 6 that reports the proportion of mortgages that are delinquent after 1, 3, and 5 years.
Whereas ARMs have slightly higher rates of delinquency at short horizons, CMs have
substantially higher rates at longer horizons. It must be kept in mind that borrowers of
complex loans have relatively high delinquency propensities despite having higher credit scores
than ARM borrowers, as summarized in Table 2. It is also insightful that the delinquency
rate increases substantially even before the minimum loan payments are reset after two or
three years, indicating that some borrowers of complex loans do not even make the relatively
low initial mortgage payments.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the proportion of households with diﬀerent mortgage types that
declare bankruptcy. We observe that FRMs have the lowest bankruptcy rate at all horizons.
Households borrowing using CMs have higher bankruptcy rates than ARMs at a ﬁve year
horizon. Thus, personal bankruptcies are signiﬁcantly less likely than mortgage delinquencies.
Panel C indicates that CM borrowers have intermediate propensities to prepay their mortgages
compared to FRM and ARM borrowers.
4.3 Hazard Model of Delinquency





where the hazard rate h(t) is the estimated probability of ﬁrst time 60-day delinquency at
time t conditional on surviving to time t−, h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate, X is a vector
of household-speciﬁc covariates, and FEYe a r
t is an indicator variable for the calendar year
to control for diﬀerent vintage eﬀects and macroeconomic conditions. We allow the baseline
22hazard to vary for each combination of the origination year v and the state s or for each
combination of the origination year v and the lender s.16 The loan sample is expanded to
a loan-year level so that time-varying covariates can be included. Also, time is scaled so
that the ﬁrst observation date is the calendar year of origination (time 0), and subsequent
calendar years are measured relative to the year of origination. Implicitly, loans of diﬀerent
vintages are compared with each other, so that the baseline hazard represents the probability
of delinquency for a borrower with covariates of 0 at t years after origination. In some
speciﬁcations we separate complex mortgages into the two sub-types (IO and NEGAM). The
continuous covariates are again standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation.
Table 7 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the propensity of ﬁrst time delinquency. In
the ﬁrst column, we only use borrower and loan characteristics at origination to estimate
the delinquency hazards. In the second column, we include area-speciﬁc variables and time-
varying characteristics. The third column incorporates controls for loan ownership to explore
the impact of securitization. The last column replaces the year-state baseline with the year-
lender baseline to control for lender-speciﬁc determinants of delinquency.
Our key ﬁnding is that CMs have signiﬁcantly higher delinquency rates than FRMs in
all speciﬁcations, notwithstanding a wide array of control variables. The eﬀect is both eco-
nomically and statistically signiﬁcant. For example, in column 1, the coeﬃcient of 0.74 for
CM implies that the probability of delinquency for a borrower with a complex mortgage
is about twice as high as for a ﬁxed rate borrower, holding all other characteristics ﬁxed
(e1×0.74/e0×0.74 =2 .1). This impact of having a complex mortgage on mortgage delinquency
is similar to a one-standard deviation decrease in the FICO credit score, which is generally
perceived to be a strong predictor of mortgage delinquency.
16The results are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly if we use a common baseline hazard, origination year-speciﬁc
baselines, or origination year and state-speciﬁc baselines.
23The ﬁrst set of additional explanatory variables in column 2 is related to cash ﬂow defaults.
Of particular interest is the variable “Payment Resets,” deﬁned as the increase in the minimum
required mortgage payment since origination. By construction, this variable is zero for FRMs.
Recall that payment resets are driven only by interest rate changes for ARMs and by both
interest rate and amortization changes for CMs. Consequently, CMs have larger resets than
ARMs, as illustrated by the CDFs of payments over time in Figure 4. Although we ﬁnd that
payment resets increase the hazard rate of delinquency, the economic magnitude of the eﬀect
is small. This, too, is consistent with the ﬁnding in Figure 4 that a relatively small fraction
of CMs experience signiﬁcant payment resets. These small increases can be attributed to a
general downward trend in interest rates over our sample period, as well as to the ability of
CM borrowers to reﬁnance loans prior to amortization resets. In sum, these results suggest a
rather limited role for contract-driven cash ﬂow shocks in explaining higher CM delinquency
rates.
Other variables related to cash ﬂow defaults include the income level and the FICO score,
which partly reﬂect households’ ﬁnancial conditions. Higher income and higher FICO house-
holds are less constrained and are indeed found to have lower delinquency rates. To gauge the
impact of local macro-economic conditions on mortgage delinquency, we include the unem-
ployment level, deﬁned as the proportion of unemployed in an MSA, and the income growth
rate, deﬁned as the growth rate of the mean income level at the MSA level since the mortgage
was originated. The estimated coeﬃcients on both variables are intuitive. Higher unemploy-
ment levels and lower income growth rates lead to more delinquencies, suggesting that general
cash ﬂow diﬃculties in meeting cash ﬂow payments contribute to mortgage delinquency.
The second set of explanatory variables is related to strategic default, deﬁned as the choice
to default on a mortgage when the house value is low relative to the remaining loan balance
even if the borrower has the means to make mortgage payments. Proxies of leverage ratios
are the most obvious candidates for explaining strategic default. Since households can always
24sell their house and pay oﬀ their mortgage in full when the remaining loan balance is low
relative to the current house value, it is not surprising that higher LTV ratios at origination
are associated with higher delinquency hazards. In Section 3.1 we argued that borrowers with
low or no documentation loans and owners of investment properties might be more willing to
default strategically. Indeed, our results conﬁrm that these variables signiﬁcantly increase the
delinquency rate.
The dynamic evolution of house values and loan balances is more germane to our attempt to
isolate contract-speciﬁc covariates of default. In particular, the lack of mandatory amortization
for complex mortgages should translate directly into higher loan balances over the loan’s
lifetime (as illustrated in Figure 5). Consequently, we introduce a time-varying measure of
change in the loan balance since origination. To further account for ﬂuctuations in household
leverage, we add an estimate of the change in the home value since origination as proxied by
the mean MSA-level house price appreciation since the origination of the speciﬁc loan. Our
results in column 2 suggest that both factors contribute to mortgage delinquencies. However,
house price declines play a signiﬁcantly stronger economic role in explaining delinquencies
than the deferral of loan amortization common in CM contracts. Notably, the inclusion of all
these controls for cash ﬂow or strategic defaults preserve the independent eﬀect of contract
choice, as the coeﬃcient on the CM dummy remains practically unchanged.
Finally, in column 3, we control for whether the mortgage was securitized by Government
Sponsored Entities or by private parties. Since the impact of securitization has obtained
signiﬁcant attention in the literature, we want to ensure that the impact of complex loans is
not subsumed by the lenders’ propensity to securitize. We ﬁnd that complex mortgages are
still associated with higher delinquency hazards after controlling for government and private
securitization. Thus, the role of mortgage contract design is distinct from the well-documented
impact of securitization.
The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations of Table 7 use state-year baseline hazards and already control
25for state and time speciﬁc determinants of delinquency.17 The last speciﬁcation uses lender-
year baseline hazards, which accounts for the possibility that mortgages originated by diﬀerent
lenders exhibit diﬀerent delinquency rates over time because individual lenders attract a par-
ticular borrower type that might focus on speciﬁc mortgage contracts. Complex mortgages
exhibit higher delinquency rates under all speciﬁcations.18
The fact that CMs have signiﬁcantly higher delinquency rates subject to a multitude of
controls suggests that CM borrowers are fundamentally diﬀerent from FRM borrowers. They
might be more risk seeking in general, as revealed by their choices for CM contracts. They
might have riskier income or might be more receptive to the idea of strategic default. These
results are consistent with the structural model of Corbae and Quintin (2010), who ﬁnd that
the presence of nontraditional mortgages ampliﬁed the severity of the mortgage crisis.
4.4 Delinquency and Financial Sophistication
Complex mortgages can be originated to households with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial sophis-
tication. The predatory lending hypothesis postulates that complex mortgages are sold to
unsophisticated investors that do not understand the detailed contract speciﬁcations. This
hypothesis suggests that delinquencies are particularly likely for unsophisticated borrowers
using complex mortgages. On the other hand, for sophisticated CM borrowers delinquencies
could be higher if these borrowers have higher propensities to default strategically.
Since we do not have any direct household-level measures of ﬁnancial sophistication, we
use two proxies: the households’ income level and the FICO score. Borrowers with higher
income levels tend to be more ﬁnancially sophisticated. Furthermore, households that can
maintain a high FICO score show that they have the discipline and knowledge to plan their
17The results are not aﬀected qualitatively if we use MSA-year baseline hazards instead.
18In unreported regressions, we also restricted the sample to CM and ARM mortgages issued to prime
borrowers. Doing so eliminates FRM and subprime borrowers that may be fundamentally diﬀerent from
complex mortgage borrowers on some unobserved risk tolerance or behavioral characteristics. The results still
suggest considerably higher conditional delinquency rates for CMs.
26ﬁnancial matters eﬀectively. In addition, since the sensitivity of the delinquency rate to the
LTV ratio captures households’ tendency to strategically default on their mortgages, we use
the default sensitivity to LTV as a measure of sophistication. If complex borrowers are more
receptive to the idea of strategic default, then we expect a stronger default sensitivity to the
loan-to-value ratio for complex mortgages.
Table 8 introduces interaction eﬀects between complex mortgages and the income level,
the FICO credit score, and the LTV ratio to our baseline hazard model. Consistent with the
sophisticated borrower hypothesis, we ﬁnd positive interaction eﬀects in all these cases. This
holds true whether interactions are estimated one-by-one (columns 1-3) or jointly (column 4).
T h ee s t i m a t eo fγ in column 2 suggests that the improvement in the hazard rate from a one
standard deviation increase in the FICO score is about 6% lower for a CM mortgage than for
an FRM mortgage.19
Table 8 shows that while CM borrowers on average default more than traditional mortgage
borrowers, the diﬀerence in the delinquency rates for complex and traditional borrowers is
particularly high for households with higher income levels and with higher FICO credit scores.
Moreover, the delinquency rate of complex borrowers is particularly sensitive to measures of
strategic default like the LTV ratio. Together, this evidence suggests that strategic default
considerations play an important role in explaining the high delinquency rates of complex
mortgages during the recent mortgage crisis.
19The interpretation of interaction eﬀects in non-linear models is subject to the well-known critique of Ai
and Norton (2003). However, we make use of the speciﬁc functional form of the Cox proportional hazard model
to argue that the reported coeﬃcients have a direct and natural interpretation. To see this, let’s consider the
example of the interaction term between the FICO score and the CM indicator. Taking logs of the hazard
function and then diﬀerentiating with respect to FICOyields ∂log h(i,t)/∂FICO = βFICO+γ ×CM.S i n c e
CM is a binary variable, γ shows the diﬀerence in relative changes in the hazard function in response to
changes in the FICO score for diﬀerent types of mortgages.
274.5 Personal Bankruptcy vs. Mortgage Delinquency
The decision to default on a mortgage is related to the decision to declare bankruptcy. Con-
trasting the determinants of personal bankruptcy with the determinants of mortgage delin-
quency gives us important insights about the motivation of the delinquency behavior. It is
not necessary that households that default on their mortgages are also declaring bankruptcy.
Nor is it necessary that households that declare bankruptcy default on their mortgages. For
example, in our sample only 13% of households that are delinquent on their mortgage also
declare bankruptcy.20
Table 9 reports the propensity of households to declare personal bankruptcy. Not surpris-
ingly, most coeﬃcients have the same signs as in the delinquency regression of Table 7. For
example, higher income and higher FICO scores reduce the propensities of both mortgage
delinquency and bankruptcy. It is interesting that some variables show up with diﬀerent signs
in the two regressions. For example, although households with investment properties have
signiﬁcantly higher mortgage delinquency rates, they are not more likely to ﬁle for personal
bankruptcy. This evidence suggests that owners of investment properties are more likely to
walk away from the property when it is economical to do so, even if they can aﬀord to continue
the mortgage payment. Similarly, loans with low documentation are also more likely to be
delinquent but do not have higher bankruptcy rates.
To capture other complex mortgage borrowers that might also be more strategic in their
default decisions, we include an interaction eﬀect between complex mortgages and prior mort-
gage delinquency. Whereas households with prior mortgage delinquencies are substantially
more likely to declare personal bankruptcy, we observe that this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly reduced
for borrowers with complex loans. That is, conditional on delinquency, complex borrowers ex-
hibit a smaller increase in the probability of declaring bankruptcy than traditional borrowers
20See Li, White, and Zhu (2010) for a discussion of the relationship between bankruptcy laws and mortgage
defaults.
28after being delinquent on their mortgage.21 This result suggests that borrowers of complex
mortgages are less likely to be delinquent due to adverse cash ﬂow shocks, which would aﬀect
both mortgage delinquency and personal bankruptcy. Instead, they are more likely to strate-
gically default on their mortgages when it is optimal to do so, for example, when the value of
the house as a going concern is lower than the remaining mortgage balance.
4.6 Additional Robustness Tests
Whereas interest-only mortgages keep a stable loan-to-value ratio over the ﬁrst three to ﬁve
years of the loan, negative amortization loans allow households to increase their debt level
during the ﬁrst years after the loan origination. Thus one should expect a magniﬁcation eﬀect
for the more extreme negative amortization contracts. Table 10 separates IO and NEGAM
loans and indicates that the coeﬃcients for negative amortization loans are generally larger in
magnitude than for the more conservative IO loans. For example, an IO mortgage has twice
as high a propensity to be delinquent than a FRM. On the other hand, a NEGAM has about
2.4 times higher propensity to default than a FRM.
Table 11 shows that CM borrowers exhibit higher delinquency rates than borrowers of
FRM for the subsamples of full documentation loans, for purchase transactions, for investment
properties, for non-securitized loans, and for loans not originated in California.
In addition, we also run the hazard models separately for each annual origination cohort.
The coeﬃcients on complex loans are signiﬁcantly positive for each individual origination co-
hort between 2003 and 2007. Furthermore, the remaining coeﬃcients are generally consistent
over the diﬀerent cohorts.
21Since both of the interacted variables (CM and Delinquency) are binary, it is more natural to compute
the associated marginal eﬀect and statistical signiﬁcance using the approach outlined in Li, White, and Zhu
(2010). In unreported results, we compute diﬀerences in predicted eﬀects of the onset of delinquency on
bankruptcy for CM and non-CM loans using the full estimated model, with other control variables at their
sample means. The associated standard errors are computed using the delta method. The test conﬁrms that
the estimated interaction eﬀect is strongly negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
295 Conclusions
The recent housing crisis brought the extension of credit to subprime borrowers and agency
problems inherent in mortgage securitization to the forefront of academic research. This paper
focuses on a diﬀerent aspect of credit markets during this time – namely, the proliferation of
non-amortizing mortgages. In addition to variable interest rates, such mortgages also feature
changes in amortization schedules set oﬀ by a variety of triggers. These complex mortgage
contracts became very popular during the mid-2000s and vanished almost completely after
the housing crisis of 2007-2009.
We ﬁnd that complex mortgages are the contract of choice for high credit quality and high
income households, in contrast to the low income population targeted by subprime mortgages.
These households use complex mortgages as aﬀordability products to purchase houses that are
expensive relative to their incomes, partly due to their expectations of higher future income
and house price growth. Complex mortgage borrowers are more likely to provide incomplete
documentation for their loans, to be owners of investment properties, and to reside in non-
recourse states in which lenders do not have access to non-collateralized assets in the event of
mortgage delinquency.
Consistent with the notion that households who self select into complex mortgage prod-
ucts are fundamentally diﬀerent from traditional mortgage borrowers, we ﬁnd that complex
mortgages experienced substantially higher defaults, controlling for a variety of borrower and
loan characteristics, as well as macroeconomic shocks. Higher delinquency rates cannot be
attributed solely to greater leverage of complex mortgages and the onset of amortization re-
sets brought about by inability to reﬁnance complex loans. Furthermore, the diﬀerence in the
delinquency rates between complex and traditional borrowers increases with both measures of
ﬁnancial sophistication (like income or credit scores) and measures of strategic default (like the
LTV ratio). Conditional on being delinquent on their mortgages, complex borrowers exhibit a
30smaller increase in the probability of declaring bankruptcy than traditional borrowers. These
results suggest that complex mortgage borrowers are more strategic in their default decisions
than other types of mortgage borrowers. Overall, both the characteristics of complex mort-
gage borrowers and their default behavior shed doubt on the popular perception that complex
mortgages are pushed by predatory lenders to naive households who do not fully understand
the mortgage terms.
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34Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports means, standard deviations, medians, and ﬁrst and third quartiles for our data
sample.
Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quart. Median 3rd Quart.
Loan Amount 210,944 150,387 108,431 168,000 267,500
House Value 305,969 252,661 144,900 232,000 385,000
Income 97,359 81,844 50,000 75,000 115,000
Income with Full Documentation 91,975 78,548 48,000 71,000 108,000
FICO 707 67 662 715 762
FICO less than 620 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
First Lien Loan to Value (LTV) 0.74 0.18 0.67 0.79 0.82
Value to Income (VTI) 3.60 2.34 2.22 3.18 4.42
Initial Interest Rate (in %) 5.97 1.39 5.50 6.00 6.50
Hypothetical FRM Interest Rate (in %) 6.19 0.45 5.88 6.13 6.50
Reﬁnance 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Condo 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment Property 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low Documentation 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Securitized 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Private Securitized 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
With Prepayment Penalty 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
Above Conforming Limit 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
MSA Level Variables
BEA Income 37,710 8,194 32,085 36,538 42,349
College or More 0.34 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.44
Young 0.40 0.09 0.35 0.40 0.45
House Price Change Prior 5 Years 0.55 0.33 0.26 0.49 0.78
Population Growth (in %) 1.10 1.44 0.29 0.82 1.74
Unemployment Rate (in %) 5.01 1.39 4.10 4.80 5.70
Non-Recourse Mortgage 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Observations 10,135,601Table 2: Summary Statistics by Mortgage Type
This table reports summary statistics for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARM), Complex Mortgages (CM), and for diﬀerent types of complex mortgages including Interest-
Only Mortgages (IO) and Negative Amortization Mortgages (NEGAM).
All Mortgages Complex Mortgages
FRM ARM CM IO NEGAM
Loan Amount 178,534 221,526 332,598 326,831 353,446
House Value 264,189 307,238 471,754 462,870 503,870
Income 87,835 99,816 133,581 131,172 142,290
Income with Full Documentation 85,302 95,572 117,895 117,194 121,300
FICO 710 681 713 715 707
FICO less than 620 0.10 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.04
First Lien Loan to Value (LTV) 0.74 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.72
Value to Income (VTI) 3.47 3.52 4.15 4.13 4.22
Initial Interest Rate (in %) 6.16 6.17 5.04 5.92 1.86
Hypothetical FRM Interest Rate (in %) 6.17 6.21 6.23 6.25 6.15
Reﬁnance 0.41 0.35 0.45 0.40 0.64
Condo 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.15
Investment Property 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11
Low Documentation 0.11 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.43
Government Securitized 0.79 0.40 0.26 0.31 0.06
Private Securitized 0.15 0.42 0.53 0.52 0.57
With Prepayment Penalty 0.06 0.27 0.33 0.19 0.81
Above Conforming Limit 0.05 0.14 0.33 0.31 0.39
MSA Level Variables
BEA Income 36,918 37,483 40,953 41,004 40,767
College or More 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.38
Young 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40
House Price Change Prior 5 Years 0.50 0.56 0.74 0.72 0.82
Population Growth (in %) 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.14 0.96
Unemployment Rate (in %) 5.03 5.20 4.79 4.75 4.97
Non-Recourse Mortgage 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.25
Number of Observations 7,077,626 1,284,132 1,773,843 1,389,488 384,355Table 3: Multinomial Logit Regressions
This table reports the coeﬃcients of multinomial logit regressions for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM),
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM), and Complex Mortgages (CM). The coeﬃcients are measured
relative to FRM. The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One and two asterisks denote
signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Individual-level MSA-Level State Lender
Covariates Covariates Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects
ARM CM ARM CM ARM CM ARM CM
Log(Income) 0.33∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
FICO −0.52∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.51∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.46∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.20∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
VTI 0.30∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Low Documentation 0.09∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.54∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Above Loan Limit 0.71∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 1.17∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 1.12∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Condo 0.59∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Investment Property 0.29∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Reﬁnance −0.26∗∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.29∗∗ −0.30∗∗ 0.09∗ −0.20∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
College or More 0.11∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Young 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
House Price Change 0.08∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.02 0.30∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population Growth 0.02 0.12∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗ 0.03 0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Log(BEA Income) 0.10∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Non-Recourse States 0.34∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No No Yes No
Lender Dummies No No No Yes
Observations 10,135,601 8,914,795 8,914,795 6,719,987Table 4: Multinomial Logit Regressions for Detailed Classiﬁcation
This table reports the coeﬃcients of multinomial logit regressions for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM),
Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM), Interest-Only Mortgages (IO), and Negative Amortization Mort-
gages (NEGAM). The coeﬃcients are measured relative to FRM. The signiﬁcance levels are abbre-
viated with asterisks: One and two asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Individual-level Covariates MSA-level Covariates
ARM IO NEGAM ARM IO NEGAM
Log(Income) 0.33∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.72∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FICO −0.52∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.51∗∗ −0.02 −0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
LTV 0.20∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.56∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
VTI 0.30∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Low Documentation 0.11∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 1.60∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 1.64∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Above Loan Limit 0.71∗∗ 1.27∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 1.18∗∗ 1.10∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Condo 0.59∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Investment Property 0.29∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Reﬁnance −0.25∗∗ 0.02 1.07∗∗ −0.21∗∗ 0.08 1.21∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
College or More 0.11∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Young 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
House Price Change 0.08∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.56∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Population Growth 0.02 0.13∗∗ 0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Log(BEA Income) 0.10∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
Non-Recourse States 0.34∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.83∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
State Dummies No No
Lender Dummies No No
Observations 10,135,601 8,914,795Table 5: Multinomial Logit Regressions for Subsamples
This table reports the coeﬃcients of multinomial logit regressions for the following subsamples:
loans with full documentation; loans originated to purchase a new house; loans used to ﬁnance an
investment property; non-securitized loans; and loans originated in states other than California. The
coeﬃcients are measured relative to FRM. The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks:
One and two asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Full Purchases Investment Not Exclude
Documentation Only Property Securitized California
Log(Income) 0.42∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FICO −0.15∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
LTV 0.37∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
VTI 0.34∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Low Documentation 0.58∗∗ −0.15∗∗ 2.14∗∗ 0.67∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.13) (0.05)
Above Loan Limit 1.06∗∗ 1.18∗∗ 0.97∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 1.03∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Condo 0.45∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Investment Property 0.04 0.29∗∗ 0.03 0.29∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Reﬁnance 0.09∗ 0.03 0.42∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
College or More 0.05∗ 0.04∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Young 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
House Price Change 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Population Growth 0.13∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.05 0.18∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(BEA Income) 0.11∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.02 0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Non-Recourse States 0.63∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Origination Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No No No No No
Lender Dummies No No No No No
Observations 3,279,098 5,214,519 826,569 929,429 7,545,202Table 6: Mortgage Delinquencies and Household Bankruptcies
This table reports the proportion of mortgages that are at least 60 days delinquent, the proportion
of households with mortgages that declare bankruptcy, and the proportion of mortgages that are
prepaid after one, three, and ﬁve years. Mortgages are prepaid if a borrower reﬁnances the loan or
pays back the loan completely before maturity.
Panel A: Proportion of Mortgages that are Delinquent
FRM ARM CM
1 Year 2.62 6.57 3.77
3 Years 9.43 16.30 17.42
5 Years 12.66 19.50 24.06
Number of Loans 7,077,626 1,284,132 1,773,843
Panel B: Proportion of Households Declaring Bankruptcy
FRM ARM CM
1 Year 0.25 0.53 0.25
3 Years 1.52 2.38 2.19
5 Years 2.16 3.05 3.20
Number of Loans 7,077,626 1,284,132 1,773,843
Panel C: Proportion of Mortgages that are Prepaid
FRM ARM CM
1 Year 7.39 15.10 11.09
3 Years 28.30 46.95 36.94
5 Years 38.86 59.47 45.12
Number of Loans 7,077,626 1,284,132 1,773,843Table 7: Hazard Model of Mortgage Delinquency
This table reports the estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model for mortgage delinquency.
The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One and two asterisks denote signiﬁcance at
the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Individual-level MSA-Level Securitization Lender-Year
Covariates Covariates Controls Baselines
CM 0.74∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.67∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ARM 0.48∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Income) −0.13∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FICO −0.67∗∗ −0.66∗∗ −0.64∗∗ −0.63∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.52∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VTI 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Documentation 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Above Loan Limit 0.22∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Condo −0.16∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Investment Property 0.39∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reﬁnance 0.09∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College or More −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Young 0.02∗ 0.02∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(BEA Income) 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in House Value −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.47∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in Loan Balance 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Payment Resets 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)






State-Year Baselines Yes Yes Yes No
Lender-Year Baselines No No No Yes
Observations 32,590,515 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,718Table 8: Hazard Model of Mortgage Delinquency with Interaction Eﬀects
This table reports the estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model for mortgage delinquency,
with interaction eﬀects that capture the sensitivity of complex mortgage delinquencies to other loan
and household characteristics. The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One and two
asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
CM 0.70∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.69∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CM x Log(Income) 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
CM x FICO 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
CM x LTV 0.10∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
ARM 0.49∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Income) −0.10∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FICO −0.66∗∗ −0.68∗∗ −0.66∗∗ −0.68∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.50∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VTI 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Documentation 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Above Loan Limit 0.28∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Condo −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment Property 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reﬁnance 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College or More −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Young 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(BEA Income) 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in House Value −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in Loan Balance 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Payment Resets 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income Growth since Origination −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,647Table 9: Hazard Models of Personal Bankruptcy
This table reports the estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model for personal bankruptcy.
The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One and two asterisks denote signiﬁcance at
the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
CM 0.65∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Delinquency 1.30∗∗ 1.37∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
CM x Delinquency −0.28∗∗
(0.04)
ARM 0.32∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(Income) −0.17∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FICO −0.47∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.37∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.58∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VTI −0.22∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Low Documentation 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Above Loan Limit 0.20∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.26∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Condo −0.29∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Investment Property 0.05 0.01 −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Reﬁnance 0.41∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College or More −0.21∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Young −0.06∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(BEA Income) −0.02 −0.04∗ −0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in House Value −0.35∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.31∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in Loan Balance 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Payment Resets −0.00 −0.01∗ −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Income Growth since Origination −0.18∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 34,252,339 26,778,403 26,778,403 26,778,403Table 10: Hazard Model of Mortgage Delinquency for Detailed Classiﬁcation
This table reports the estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model for mortgage delinquency for
diﬀerent types of complex loans including IO and NEGAM. The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated
with asterisks: One and two asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
IO 0.68∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.66∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
NEGAM 0.89∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.99∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.86∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IO x Log(Income) 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
NEGAM x Log(Income) 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
IO x FICO 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
NEGAM x FICO 0.21∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
IO x LTV 0.09∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
NEGAM x LTV 0.22∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
ARM 0.49∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Income) −0.08∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FICO −0.66∗∗ −0.66∗∗ −0.68∗∗ −0.67∗∗ −0.68∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.49∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VTI 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Documentation 0.03∗ 0.02 0.02 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Above Loan Limit 0.31∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Condo −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment Property 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reﬁnance 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College or More −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Young 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(BEA Income) 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in House Value −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Increase in Loan Balance 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Payment Resets 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income Growth since Origination −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.16∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,647 25,619,647Table 11: Hazard Model of Mortgage Delinquency for Subsamples
This table reports the estimates from a Cox proportional hazard model for mortgage delinquency for
the following subsamples: loans with full documentation; loans originated to purchase a new house;
loans used to ﬁnance an investment property; non-securitized loans; and loans originated in states
other than California. The signiﬁcance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One and two asterisks
denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Full Purchases Investment Not Exclude
Documentation Only Property Securitized California
CM 0.60∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.69∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CM x Log(Income) 0.07∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CM x FICO 0.03∗∗ 0.02 0.10∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CM x LTV 0.01 −0.09∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.04 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
ARM 0.45∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log(Income) −0.14∗∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FICO −0.71∗∗ −0.68∗∗ −0.69∗∗ −0.77∗∗ −0.69∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LTV 0.48∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VTI 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Documentation 0.06∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Above Loan Limit 0.26∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.03 0.31∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Condo −0.06∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment Property 0.37∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Reﬁnance 0.00 0.24∗∗ 0.04 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
College −0.19∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.20∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Young 0.02 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(BEA Income) 0.05∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Increase in House Value −0.44∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.39∗∗ −0.44∗∗ −0.42∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Increase in Loan Balance −0.01 −0.02 0.11∗∗ 0.03 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Payment Resets 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate 0.03∗ 0.03 −0.01 −0.03∗ 0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Income Growth since Origination −0.15∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Composition of Mortgage Products.
The ﬁgure depicts the composition between Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable Rate























































































































Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions by Mortgage Type
These ﬁgures depict the cumulative distribution functions of the income level, the FICO
score, and the value-to-income ratio (VTI) for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable
Rate Mortgages (ARM), and Complex Mortgages (CM) over the period between 1995 and
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Figure 3: Mortgage Payment Relative to FRM
These ﬁgures depict the actual mortgage payments for Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM)
and for Complex Mortgages (CM) one, three, and ﬁve years after origination relative to the
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Figure 4: Mortgage Payments Over Time
These ﬁgures depict the cumulative distribution functions of the actual mortgage payments
for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM), and for Complex
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Figure 5: Remaining Mortgage Balances
These ﬁgures depict the remaining mortgage balances after one, three, and ﬁve years relative
to the initial balances for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM),
























Figure 6: Proportion of Mortgage Delinquencies by Month After Origination
The ﬁgure depicts the proportion of surviving loans that are delinquent by month after orig-
nation for Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRM), Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARM), and Complex
Mortgages (CM) over the period between 2003 and 2009.